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Abstract 
 
Emissions distribution is a focus variable for the design of future international agreements to 
tackle global warming. This paper specifically analyses the future path of emissions distribution 
and its determinants in different scenarios. Whereas our analysis is driven by tools which are 
typically applied in the income distribution literature and which have recently been applied to 
the analysis of CO2 emissions distribution, a new methodological approach is that our study is 
driven by simulations run with a popular regionalised optimal growth climate change model over 
the 1995-2105 period. We find that the architecture of environmental policies, the 
implementation of flexible mechanisms and income concentration are key determinants of 
emissions distribution over time. In particular we find a robust positive relationship between 
measures of inequalities in the distribution of emissions and income and that their magnitude 
will essentially depend on technological change. 
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 1. Introduction 
The study of the international distribution of greenhouse gas emissions is essential in 
order to analyze the problem of climate change and design control measures. There are major 
differences in the per capita emissions of the different regions of the world, and this inequality 
between regions shows different levels of responsibility in the contribution to climate change. 
An analysis of this inequality therefore provides information for the debate about the different 
control policies to be applied in different countries.  
Distribution has become an important issue when dealing with the negotiation and 
agreement of policies for global climate change. Properly considering this issue when designing 
policies leads to an increase in perceived fairness and facilitates widespread participation in 
policy agreements. 
Rich countries are responsible for much higher emissions in absolute and per capita 
terms. However, the huge growth rates of CO2 emissions in some expanding economies means 
that any solution designed to stabilize greenhouse emissions requires the participation of both 
developed and developing economies. The stabilization of concentrations of greenhouse gas 
emission involves limiting the level of global emissions and distributing this level between the 
different countries. Several approaches to the distribution of future emission “entitlements” and 
to the distribution of abatement costs have been argued2. An analysis of present and future 
emissions distribution should also provide information about the distribution of future emission 
entitlements and abatement costs.  
Over the last decade, several studies have focused on the distributive analysis of CO2 
emissions and energy consumption. Sun (2002) and Alcántara and Duro (2004) analysed 
inequalities in energy intensity. Heil and Wodon (1997, 2000), and Padilla and Serrano (2006) 
use several indexes that are commonly employed in income distribution analysis to study the 
evolution of international inequality in CO2 emissions. Heil and Wodon (1997) used a group 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient to study inequality in per capita CO2 emissions and the 
contribution of two income groups to this inequality. Heil and Wodon (2000) employed the 
same methodology to analyze future inequality in carbon emissions using projections to the 
year 2100, and also considered the scenario under the impact of the Kyoto Protocol and other 
mitigation proposals. Padilla and Serrano (2006) employed concentration indexes and showed 
that inequality between rich and poor countries (concentration of emissions in richer countries) 
has diminished less than “simple” inequality in emissions, and showed the contribution of four 
income groups to inequality through a Theil index decomposition. Duro and Padilla (2006) 
explain the main sources of emission inequality by decomposing international inequality in CO2 
emissions into the different Kaya factors and two interaction terms, and also decompose 
emissions inequality between and within groups of countries. In this paper our original 
contribution will be to analyse the distribution of emissions for different future scenarios 
involving international agreements designed to deal with the issue of climate change. To do 
this, we will use a popular climate change optimal growth model RICE99. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to use integrated assessment models for this purpose, and it 
is our intuition that the optimal growth models that are typically used to investigate such 
traditional analyses as technological change, policy costs, timing of abatement and scenario 
analyses could also be used effectively for a wider range of scientific analyses. In section 2 we 
explain the model and scenarios, section 3 presents our results, and the paper ends with our 
conclusions.  
                                                          
2 Distribution of entitlements in per capita terms (see e.g., Grubb, 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1991; 
Meyer, 1995), distribution based on current emission levels (e.g. Pearce and Warford, 1993), on GNP 
shares (Wirth and Lashof, 1990; Cline, 1992) and many combinations of these. As for the distribution 
of abatement costs, the proposals are mainly based on different applications of the “polluter pays” 
principle and indexes of ability to pay (see IPCC, 1996; pp. 103-112). 
2. Model and scenarios 
Nordhaus and Boyer (1999)’s RICE is a regional dynamic general equilibrium model for 
the study of the economic aspects of climate change. The RICE model basically considers a 
single sector optimal growth model by suitably incorporating the interactions between economic 
activities and climate. The world is divided into eight macro regions: USA, Other High Income 
countries (OHI), OECD Europe (Europe), Eastern European countries (EE), Middle Income 
countries (MI), Lower Middle Income countries (LMI), China (CHN), and Low Income countries 
(LI). Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and 
carbon energy input that maximize the present value of per capita consumption. Nordhaus and 
Boyer’s starting assumption is that a Social Planner optimally runs its own region, indexed by n, 
by maximizing the following discounted utility function: 
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Where C(n,t) stands for consumption, β is the discount factor and L(n,t) is the population 
level. The maximization process is subject to some constraints that capture the economic as 
well as environmental dynamics. 
The Resource Constraint for each region links consumption with net output Y and with 
physical investments I. The following equation identifies the Resource Constraint3: 
 C(n,t) = Y(n,t) – I(n,t) (2) 
The gross value added obtained from the production process is described by the 
following equation: 
 Q(n,t) = A(n,t)[K(n,t)γCE(n,t)αnL(n,t)(1-γ-αn)] - pe(n,t)CE(n,t)  (3) 
Where A(n,t) denotes the state of the technology, K(n,t) is physical capital, CE(n,t) is 
carbon energy, and pe(n,t) is the price of carbon energy. Apart from A(n,t) and L(n,t), all of the 
inputs in this value-added equation are endogenously determined. Note that the evolution of 
A(n,t) accounts for productivity growth by production-enhancing technological change. In the 
model this index follows an exogenously determined concave path that increases over time. 
There is a wedge Ω between gross and net output production due to alterations to the 
climate. This wedge is inversely related to and driven by the damage function D(n,t): 
 Y(n,t)= Ω(n,t)Q(n,t) (4) 
 Ω(n,t)=1/D(n,t) (5) 
 D(n,t) =1+ θ1,nT(t) + θ2,nT(t)2 (6) 
Where D(n,t) is environmental damage4, T(t) is the increase in temperature and θ1,n, θ2,n 
are regionalized parameters capturing the impact of temperature. Environmental damage is a 
key variable influencing how the model captures capital accumulation by including 
environmental resources. We refer to natural resources (intended as a flow) and not to 
environmental capital stocks, because the basic assumptions of this model are that there is an 
unlimited stock of natural resources and that the demand for carbon energy is always satisfied 
by supply. Scarcity is only reflected in the price of carbon. 
                                                          
3 When we introduce an emissions permit market, equation (2) should also include the revenue 
(expenditure) for the sale (purchase) of permits. 
4 Environmental damage should not be interpreted as the cost of climate change. It represents the 
willingness to pay to avoid deterioration by global warming. 
 
The green technological effect is described by: 
 E(n,t) =ζ(n,t)CE(n,t) (7) 
Where E(n,t) represents the level of industrial CO2 emissions. Notice that the coefficient ς(n,t) in (7) represents the emissions/carbon-energy ratio and captures the second form of 
technological change of the RICE99 model: emission-reducing technological change. This index 
of carbon intensity is exogenously determined and follows a negative exponential path over 
time. It represents the assumption of a costless improvement in green technology gained by 
agents over time. Total emissions will be derived from the sum of industrial emissions and 
emissions from land use. 
 TE(n,t) = E(n,t)+ETREE(n,t) (8) 
Where TE(n,t) are total emissions and ETREE(n,t) is a regional exogenous variable 
representing CO2 land use emissions5. 
The RICE99 model is our tool for investigating the relationship between income 
distribution and emissions distribution. We will use techniques derived from the inequality 
literature such as those in Padilla and Serrano (2006). The main difference is that whereas 
Padilla and Serrano base their analysis on historical data, in this paper we will analyse 
projections of results derived from a popular climate change optimal growth model. 
The main difficulty we faced was uncertainty. Projections of relevant economic and 
environmental variables over time strongly depend on the assumptions and calibration of the 
model and on the political and social evolutions derived from the future international setting. 
The best method for overcoming the limitations of modelling is to implement sensitivity 
analyses and adopt a wide comparison of models. Whereas the major differences in the 
features of the most used climate change models mean they are extremely difficult to compare, 
a sensitivity analysis should involve a large number of relevant parameters (discount rate, 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, total factor productivity and all other calibrated 
variables) that could affect the distribution of emissions and income over time. This procedure 
is extremely time consuming and does not guarantee information of any added value. We 
believe it is more reasonable to work with the highly popular DICE/RICE family of climate 
change models that have been widely used in science to tackle the “hot” topics of global 
warming (Toth 1995, Nordhaus and Zhang 1996, Castelnuovo et al. 2003, Gerlagh 2004, Bosetti 
et al. 2005).  
The uncertainty surrounding the future evolution of the international political framework 
is dealt with by an extensive analysis of scenarios. Unlike Heil and Woodon (1997) (the only 
previous distributive analysis of future international CO2 inequality) we run a wide range of 
scenarios involving possible future environmental policies. 
                                                          
5 Other GHG are included in the RICE99 model by an exogenous variable O(t) affecting radiative forcing 
and temperature increase together with the accumulated CO2 atmospheric concentration. 
Table 1 Scenario descriptions 
Scenario Description 
BAU Business as usual. No policy. 
Kyoto no trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario”. No market of 
pollution permits. 
Kyoto trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario”. Since 2015 
market of pollution permits. 
Kyoto + USA no 
trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario” for OHI, WE 
and EE. From 2035 USA is obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 2025. No market of 
pollution permits. 
Kyoto + USA trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario” for OHI, WE 
and EE. From 2035 USA is obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 2025. Since 2015 
market of pollution permits. 
Global Kyoto  no 
trading 
In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario” for OHI, WE 
and EE. From 2035 USA and non Annex I regions are obliged to maintain the level of emissions 
as in 2025. No market of pollution permits. 
Global Kyoto trading In 2015 Kyoto emission constraint for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe regions. 
Further 10% emissions reduction in 2025. From 2025 “Kyoto forever scenario” for OHI, WE 
and EE. From 2035 USA and non Annex I regions are obliged to maintain the level of emissions 
as in 2025. No market of pollution permits. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
Temp no trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 2.5 
degree global atmospheric constraint. No market of pollution permits. 
Temp trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 2.5 
degree global atmospheric constraint. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
Conc no trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 
ppm global atmospheric constraint.No  market of pollution permits. 
Conc trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 
ppm global atmospheric constraint. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
Conc Sov no trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 
ppm global atmospheric constraint. The burden among regions is shared according to the 
sovereignty rule. No  market of pollution permits. 
Conc Sov trading Kyoto commitment for OHI, Western Europe and Eastern Europe in 2015. From 2025 a 550 
ppm global atmospheric constraint. The burden among regions is shared according to the 
sovereignty rule. Since 2015 market of pollution permits. 
 
As shown in Table 1, in all scenarios we assume that all Annex I countries except the 
USA accomplish the 2015 Kyoto emissions target. Scenarios differ for different assumptions 
concerning post Kyoto agreements. We ran scenarios implying emission stabilizing policies and 
global atmospheric constraints. For emission stabilizing policies we assume 3 cases: in the first, 
the “Kyoto forever” scenario, Annex I regions (excluding the United States) are subject to a 
further 10% reduction in emissions in 2025 and are then obliged to maintain the same 
emissions cap forever (Bosetti and Buchner 2005). The United States and developing countries 
observe a BAU policy. In the “Kyoto + USA” scenario, the USA joins the Kyoto Protocol (Galeotti 
2003, Cantore 2006) in 2035 and stabilizes its level of emissions at the 2025 level6. In the 
Global Kyoto scenario, from 2035 developing countries also decide to join the Kyoto Protocol 
together with the USA (Böhringer and Loschel 2003). We also assume 3 cases for the global 
atmospheric constraints: in the “CONC” scenario from 2025 we assume a cost effective 550 
ppm global atmospheric constraint for all regions (Gerlagh 2005). In the TEMP scenario we 
assume a 2.5 degree global atmospheric constraint (van der Zwann et al. 2002). In the CONC 
SOV scenario (Böhringer and Welsch 2006) we assume that a 550 ppm global atmospheric 
constraint is accomplished in accordance with the polluter pays principle assuming that each 
                                                          
6 The State of California’s recent decision to join the Kyoto Protocol after the Bush administration had 
rejected it makes the Kyoto + USA scenario more realistic. 
region’s reduction in emissions must be proportional to the BAU level of emissions7. For each 
scenario we assume two kinds of cases: “trading” and “non trading”. In the former we assume 
efficiency in the accomplishment of the emissions cap through an emissions permit market that 
guarantees regions the lowest abatement costs. In the latter we assume the absence of where 
flexible mechanisms. 
Technically an emissions permit market is introduced in the context of an open loop Nash 
equilibrium. Each region maximizes its utility subject to the climate module and the economic 
and emissions target constraints for a given optimal set of strategies for all the players and a 
given price of permits. In the first round, the price of permits is set at an arbitrary level. When 
all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net demand of permits is computed at 
the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is approximately zero, a Nash 
equilibrium is obtained, otherwise the price is revised in proportion to the market imbalance and 
the process starts again. (Bosetti et al., 2005).  
It is very difficult to implement a scenario ranking according to the likelihood of 
occurrence. Böhringer and Loschel (2003) attempted to consider the most likely scenarios 
according to expert opinions, but there are still major doubts in terms of the political variables 
that will affect future international evolution8. Our strategy is to consider a wide spectrum of 
possible scenarios and assess the consequences derived from each. The following section 
summarizes the results. 
3. Results 
A number of interesting results can be derived from our analysis of the 1995-2105 
period, which can be compared with those found by Padilla and Serrano (2006) for historical 
data for the 1971-1999 period and by Heil and Wodon (2000) for their projection of future 
emissions for the 1993–2100 period. However, there are some differences with respect to the 
data employed by Padilla and Serrano (2006) that should be taken into account. They used IEA 
data on CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. This data does not include land use emissions, 
which are much more important in poor countries. This explains why the inequality and 
concentration indexes for CO2 emissions found in their study are greater than the ones found 
here. These differences in data also explain why the Kakwani index (see below) is much lower 
in our study.  
As a first step we compare the Gini index for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) representing 
the concentration of income between regions (GDP Gini index)9 and the pseudo Gini index for 
CO2 emissions (CO2 pGini index or CO2 concentration index), which measures inequality in the 
distribution of emissions between regions ranked according to their level of income per capita, 
i.e. the degree of concentration of emissions in richer countries10. We consider that the CO2 p-
Gini concept is more relevant for discussions of climate distribution issues, as these discussions 
focus on the distribution of emissions between poor and rich countries11.  
In a BAU scenario the concentration of income and the CO2 pseudo Gini index are both 
decreasing (see Figures 1 and 2). The result is confirmed in those scenarios assuming a modest 
                                                          
7 The Conc Sov scenario is implemented in two steps. We first calculate the global reduction derived 
from the cost effective scenario Conc. Then for each period and region we impose an emissions 
constraint that is proportional to the global reduction according to the equity rule. 
8 Modelling and estimating CO2 emissions and income projections over the next century is a difficult 
challenge, so caution is required in the interpretation of the results. 
9 The GDP Gini index shows inequality in income distribution. This index is computed through the Lorenz 
curve, the curve that shows the degree of income inequality, i.e., the percentage of income received 
by different percentages of population, ordered in increasing value of per capita income. 
10 The CO2 pGini index is computed through the concentration curve of emissions, curve that shows the 
percentage of emissions that concentrate different shares of population, ordered in increasing value of 
per capita income (and not according to per capita emissions as would be the case if we computed the 
Gini index) 
11 However, for the 8 regions considered in this study there is very little difference (less than 1%) 
between CO2 p-Gini and CO2 Gini, which shows the importance of per capita income differences in 
explaining the differences in per capita emissions. 
reduction in emissions only for developed countries (“Kyoto”, “Kyoto + USA”) or a relatively 
balanced reduction in emissions in developed and developing countries (CONC and CONC SOV, 
see Table 2). However, even in the cases in which inequality reduction is greater there are still 
considerably high levels of inequality in emissions and GDP. As in Padilla and Serrano’s study 
(2006) of historical emissions data, in our analysis involving future projections we are able to 
make the important confirmation that inequality in income distribution is positively related to 
inequality in emissions distribution from a “between group perspective”. However scenarios 
involving a strong and disproportionate abatement effort for developing countries show an 
ambiguous relationship between the CO2 pseudo Gini index and the GDP Gini index (see Figure 
3). Whereas income concentration is still decreasing, global environmental constraints could 
require a major effort to reduce emissions in developing countries implying a higher 
concentration of emissions activities in Annex I regions. The general finding is that the 
concentrations of emissions per capita and income per capita are positively correlated. 
However, our intuition is that major environmental policies involving developing countries could 
break this relationship. Political and marginal abatement costs could play a crucial role in 
determining the future link between emissions and income distribution respectively for emission 
stabilizing policies and global atmospheric constraints. 
 
Table 2 Percent of emissions reduction (Policy vs BAU scenario) in 2100. Annex I vs non 
Annex I regions. No trading scenarios. 
 
Kyoto Kyoto + USA Global Kyoto Temp Conc Conc SOV 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
Annex I Non 
Annex I 
-7.00 -0.11 -9.00 -0.10 -9.00 -51.19 -49.70 -67.37 -29.53 -43.21 -38.92 -39.11 
Figure 1 GDP Gini index. 
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Figure 2 CO2 pGini index. 
 CO2 pGini index
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Figure 3 The relationship between the GDP Gini and the CO2 pGini index. 
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In the next step, we make a more in-depth investigation of the magnitude of changes in 
income and emissions distribution. This issue has major implications in terms of the 
“regressivity” of emissions distribution over time. Distribution of CO2 emissions is “progressive” 
when it shows a pGini of CO2 emissions (index computed by ranking regions by level of income 
per capita) which is lower than the concentration of income. For this purpose we calculate the 
Kakwani index. The Kakwani index computes the extent to which inequality in the distribution of 
emissions between richer and poorer countries is greater than inequality in the distribution of 
income. In other words, the Kakwani index computes the level of “progressivity” or 
“regressivity” of the distribution of emissions. This index is equal to the difference between the 
CO2 pGini index and the GDP Gini index. In all scenarios we always find a negative Kakwani 
index. RICE99 clearly indicates that the concentration of emissions would be smaller than the 
concentration of income, that is, CO2 concentration is “progressive” whatever the design of the 
future international agreements (see Figure 4). Therefore, in richer countries emissions are less 
concentrated than income. This result can again be compared to that found by Padilla and 
Serrano (2006) which found a positive Kakwani index for several years. The more “progressive” 
concentration of emissions found in our study is basically the result of differences in the data 
employed, which in our case includes land use change emissions. These emissions are much 
more important in poor countries, thus attenuating CO2 inequality between countries. The 
authors find a positive or close to zero Kakwani index in the 1971–1999 period except in the 
mid 1980s when the oil crisis reduced emissions in developed countries. RICE99 is a 
deterministic optimal growth model and does not assume energy market crises. The results of 
our simulations show that a “progressive” distribution of emissions could also be obtained in a 
deterministic framework in which no crises induce a rise in fossil fuel prices and lower emissions 
by developed countries as far as all emission sources are considered in the analysis. This result 
strictly depends on the calibrated values of the regional parameters A (total factor productivity, 
see equation 3) and ζ(n,t) (emissions/carbon energy ratio, see equation 7) which respectively 
regulate the output convergence among regions and environmentally friendly technological 
change. RICE99 provides the insight that the evolution of future industrial and environmental 
technology will be crucial in determining the relationship between emissions and income 
distribution. However the results also show that in every scenario the gap between the GDP 
Gini index and the CO2 pGini index will diminish over time. This decrease in “progressivity” in 
emissions distribution will be higher in such scenarios as the “Global Kyoto” assuming a major 
abatement effort in developing countries and consequently a higher redistribution of emissions 
towards developed economies. 
Figure 4 Kakwani index. 
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Previous findings can be further investigated by analyzing the determinants of emissions 
distribution over time. Specifically, the decomposition of inequality index is a useful tool for 
achieving this. We use the Theil index rather than the Gini index. As the inequality literature 
shows, the Gini index of inequality can be decomposed into a “between group”, a “within 
Group” and a residual component whose interpretation has been widely debated in income 
distribution literature (Lambert, 1993). To yield a clearer interpretation, we use the Theil index 
for our CO2 inequality decomposition analysis. The Theil index can be simply decomposed into 
“between group” and “within group” inequality components. Our aim is to verify the proportion 
representing the between group component and consequently the emissions inequality between 
different income groups in countries in terms of the overall inequality in emissions distribution. 
We aggregate RICE99 regions as 3 groups: High Income (USA, OHI and Western Europe), 
Medium Income (Eastern Europe, MI and LMI) and Low Income Countries (China and LI). 
We find an interesting set of results that can be compared in turn to those found by 
Padilla and Serrano (2006) to check the consistency between past and future paths of 
emissions and income distribution in different scenarios.  
First, in the BAU, Kyoto, Kyoto + USA, Conc, Conc Sov we find contiguity between Padilla 
and Serrano results’ (2006) and our own. In both studies there is a decrease in the simple 
emissions inequality of the between group and the within group. Again, the results seem to 
change significantly when environmental policies determine a strong imbalance in the effort to 
reduce emissions (Temp and Global Kyoto Scenario). In this case the Theil index together with 
its decomposition factors (the between and the within group components) are increasing.  
Second, we find that in each scenario the between group component is the most 
important over time and its contribution is always higher than 75%. This means that RICE99 
shows that whatever the future set of climate agreements the between group component and 
inequality in the distribution of emissions between rich and poor regions will be the most 
important driving forces and will explain more than ¾ of future emissions inequality. This result 
strongly supports that offered by Padilla and Serrano (2006) and shows that the between group 
component, which has already played a crucial role in the past, will continue to explain most 
inequalities in emissions in the future. Moreover these findings are also confirmed in those 
scenarios (Global Kyoto and Temp) that we previously claimed did not generate a clear positive 
relationship between income and emissions distribution. These finding also show that when the 
path of inequality in income does not provide strong evidence to govern the path of emissions 
distribution over time, emissions distribution is still mainly explained by differences in income 
between regions. Income distribution will also still be the main determinant if political variables 
play a complementary role in determining the path of emissions distribution over time. 
Third, in contrast to Padilla and Serrano’s (2006) analysis of past emissions, this study 
does not provide robust evidence of an increasing percentage of the between group component 
over time, but this could in part depend on the different group aggregation and on the 
assumptions and calibration of the RICE99 model 12. As Tables 3-9 show, this result is strongly 
driven by an increase in within group inequality in the Low Income Group, which is determined 
by the outstanding growth in China in comparison with that experienced by other poor regions. 
Table 3 Decomposition of the Theil index. Business as usual (BAU) scenario. 
BAU Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.351 0.297 0.054 84.685% 15.315% 9.428% 3.636% 2.251% 
2005 0.344 0.288 0.056 83.715% 16.285% 9.026% 3.137% 4.122% 
2015 0.348 0.292 0.056 83.940% 16.060% 8.548% 2.706% 4.806% 
2025 0.346 0.291 0.055 84.092% 15.908% 8.274% 2.379% 5.255% 
2035 0.337 0.284 0.053 84.192% 15.808% 7.973% 2.158% 5.677% 
2045 0.325 0.273 0.052 84.025% 15.975% 7.885% 2.000% 6.091% 
2055 0.310 0.259 0.051 83.632% 16.368% 7.933% 1.893% 6.542% 
2065 0.293 0.244 0.050 83.050% 16.950% 8.073% 1.827% 7.050% 
2075 0.276 0.227 0.049 82.305% 17.695% 8.281% 1.797% 7.617% 
2085 0.258 0.210 0.048 81.427% 18.573% 8.544% 1.796% 8.233% 
2095 0.241 0.194 0.047 80.445% 19.555% 8.854% 1.821% 8.880% 
2105 0.224 0.178 0.046 79.394% 20.606% 9.207% 1.868% 9.531% 
 
                                                          
12 Their study uses individualized data for 113 countries and small groups of countries and divides them into four 
income groups, while here we have projections for 8 regions which we group into three income groups. 
Table 4 Decomposition of the Theil index. Kyoto no trading scenario. 
Kyoto 
no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.351 0.297 0.054 84.686% 15.314% 9.428% 3.636% 2.250% 
2005 0.344 0.287 0.056 83.655% 16.345% 9.059% 3.147% 4.139% 
2015 0.339 0.275 0.064 81.099% 18.901% 11.412% 2.400% 5.089% 
2025 0.333 0.265 0.067 79.808% 20.192% 12.573% 1.937% 5.682% 
2035 0.327 0.266 0.061 81.315% 18.685% 10.883% 1.795% 6.008% 
2045 0.317 0.260 0.057 82.049% 17.951% 9.935% 1.668% 6.348% 
2055 0.303 0.250 0.054 82.260% 17.740% 9.430% 1.548% 6.763% 
2065 0.288 0.236 0.052 82.080% 17.920% 9.217% 1.436% 7.267% 
2075 0.270 0.220 0.050 81.584% 18.416% 9.216% 1.338% 7.862% 
2085 0.252 0.204 0.048 80.816% 19.184% 9.381% 1.264% 8.539% 
2095 0.234 0.187 0.047 79.814% 20.186% 9.682% 1.224% 9.280% 
2105 0.216 0.170 0.046 78.631% 21.369% 10.082% 1.230% 10.056% 
 
Table 5 Decomposition of the Theil index. Kyoto + USA no trading scenario. 
Kyoto 
+ USA 
no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.351 0.297 0.054 84.686% 15.314% 9.428% 3.636% 2.250% 
2005 0.344 0.287 0.056 83.655% 16.345% 9.059% 3.147% 4.139% 
2015 0.339 0.275 0.064 81.098% 18.902% 11.412% 2.400% 5.089% 
2025 0.333 0.265 0.067 79.808% 20.192% 12.574% 1.937% 5.682% 
2035 0.324 0.264 0.060 81.434% 18.566% 10.690% 1.812% 6.064% 
2045 0.314 0.258 0.056 82.183% 17.817% 9.710% 1.687% 6.420% 
2055 0.300 0.248 0.053 82.407% 17.593% 9.176% 1.568% 6.850% 
2065 0.284 0.234 0.050 82.248% 17.752% 8.915% 1.458% 7.379% 
2075 0.266 0.218 0.048 81.788% 18.212% 8.834% 1.364% 8.014% 
2085 0.247 0.200 0.047 81.071% 18.929% 8.881% 1.295% 8.753% 
2095 0.228 0.183 0.045 80.129% 19.871% 9.024% 1.264% 9.583% 
2105 0.209 0.165 0.044 79.008% 20.992% 9.244% 1.280% 10.468% 
 
Table 6 Decomposition of the Theil index. Global Kyoto no trading scenario. 
Global 
Kyoto 
no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.351 0.297 0.054 84.686% 15.314% 9.428% 3.635% 2.251% 
2005 0.343 0.287 0.056 83.652% 16.348% 9.060% 3.147% 4.141% 
2015 0.339 0.275 0.064 81.096% 18.904% 11.413% 2.399% 5.091% 
2025 0.332 0.265 0.067 79.817% 20.183% 12.564% 1.937% 5.683% 
2035 0.361 0.294 0.068 81.269% 18.731% 10.186% 2.045% 6.501% 
2045 0.386 0.316 0.070 81.800% 18.200% 8.842% 2.150% 7.208% 
2055 0.407 0.334 0.073 81.991% 18.009% 7.989% 2.248% 7.773% 
2065 0.425 0.348 0.076 82.023% 17.977% 7.420% 2.330% 8.226% 
2075 0.440 0.361 0.079 81.984% 18.016% 7.026% 2.397% 8.594% 
2085 0.452 0.371 0.082 81.913% 18.087% 6.745% 2.449% 8.894% 
2095 0.463 0.379 0.084 81.830% 18.170% 6.540% 2.489% 9.141% 
2105 0.472 0.386 0.086 81.746% 18.254% 6.388% 2.519% 9.347% 
 
Table 7 Decomposition of the Theil index. Temp no trading scenario. 
Temp 
no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.349 0.296 0.053 84.838% 15.162% 9.406% 3.622% 2.134% 
2005 0.344 0.289 0.055 84.108% 15.892% 8.989% 3.103% 3.800% 
2015 0.345 0.284 0.061 82.271% 17.729% 10.439% 2.838% 4.452% 
2025 0.353 0.299 0.053 84.871% 15.129% 8.065% 2.542% 4.522% 
2035 0.349 0.297 0.052 85.177% 14.823% 7.657% 2.514% 4.652% 
2045 0.345 0.294 0.051 85.307% 14.693% 7.406% 2.624% 4.663% 
2055 0.342 0.292 0.050 85.335% 14.665% 7.209% 2.895% 4.561% 
2065 0.342 0.292 0.050 85.327% 14.673% 6.990% 3.352% 4.330% 
2075 0.349 0.297 0.051 85.329% 14.671% 6.701% 4.003% 3.967% 
2085 0.362 0.309 0.053 85.353% 14.647% 6.323% 4.813% 3.511% 
2095 0.380 0.324 0.056 85.383% 14.617% 5.891% 5.682% 3.044% 
2105 0.398 0.339 0.058 85.350% 14.650% 5.506% 6.445% 2.699% 
 
Table 8 Decomposition of the Theil index. Conc no trading scenario. 
Conc 
no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.349 0.296 0.053 84.765% 15.235% 9.419% 3.628% 2.188% 
2005 0.343 0.288 0.055 83.894% 16.106% 9.027% 3.117% 3.963% 
2015 0.341 0.279 0.062 81.743% 18.257% 10.820% 2.687% 4.750% 
2025 0.348 0.294 0.054 84.494% 15.506% 8.173% 2.449% 4.884% 
2035 0.341 0.289 0.052 84.685% 15.315% 7.825% 2.317% 5.173% 
2045 0.332 0.281 0.051 84.653% 15.347% 7.672% 2.273% 5.402% 
2055 0.322 0.272 0.050 84.464% 15.536% 7.621% 2.322% 5.593% 
2065 0.311 0.262 0.049 84.185% 15.815% 7.613% 2.472% 5.730% 
2075 0.303 0.254 0.049 83.883% 16.117% 7.603% 2.741% 5.773% 
2085 0.298 0.249 0.049 83.619% 16.381% 7.550% 3.150% 5.681% 
2095 0.297 0.248 0.049 83.445% 16.555% 7.417% 3.714% 5.424% 
2105 0.303 0.253 0.050 83.389% 16.611% 7.174% 4.436% 5.001% 
 
Table 9 Decomposition of the Theil index. Conc Sov no trading scenario. 
Conc 
Sov no 
trading 
Theil Theil 
Between 
Theil 
Within 
Contribution 
between 
(%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Contribution 
within (%) 
High income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Medium 
income 
Contribution 
within (%) 
Low income 
1995 0.347 0.294 0.053 84.645% 15.355% 9.531% 3.609% 2.214% 
2005 0.344 0.288 0.056 83.772% 16.228% 9.028% 3.118% 4.082% 
2015 0.346 0.291 0.056 83.948% 16.052% 8.603% 2.702% 4.747% 
2025 0.345 0.290 0.055 84.061% 15.939% 8.318% 2.479% 5.141% 
2035 0.336 0.283 0.053 84.165% 15.835% 7.979% 2.191% 5.666% 
2045 0.324 0.272 0.052 84.016% 15.984% 7.926% 2.002% 6.056% 
2055 0.308 0.258 0.050 83.828% 16.172% 7.897% 1.921% 6.354% 
2065 0.290 0.241 0.049 83.137% 16.863% 8.029% 1.883% 6.952% 
2075 0.273 0.225 0.048 82.372% 17.628% 8.449% 1.826% 7.353% 
2085 0.256 0.209 0.047 81.701% 18.299% 8.423% 1.961% 7.916% 
2095 0.237 0.191 0.046 80.583% 19.417% 8.879% 1.905% 8.633% 
2105 0.222 0.177 0.045 79.583% 20.417% 9.241% 2.047% 9.130% 
 
Finally, unlike Heil and Wodon (1997) we also analyze the role of flexible mechanisms in 
income and emissions distributions. Trading does not widely influence emissions and income 
distribution. Emissions trading is a crucial mechanism governing the efficiency of policy 
implementation and compliance costs but in our analysis it does not generally provide 
significant insights into equity issues. The only exceptions are the Global Kyoto and Conc Sov 
scenarios (see Figures 5-10). Whereas in the Global Kyoto scenario, when we implement 
trading, non Annex I regions buy a huge quantity of permits and we observe a redistribution of 
emissions towards poor countries, in the Conc Sov scenario Annex I regions are mostly permit 
buyers and trading generates a redistribution of emissions towards developed regions. In other 
words the magnitude and the sign of the impact of trading on emissions distribution essentially 
depend on the structure of marginal costs for each country, on the level of global abatement 
reduction and on how the abatement effort is shared among regions. However the magnitude 
of the impacts of environmental constraints on the economic variables does not appear to be 
relevant. 
Figure 5  Non trading vs trading. Kyoto scenario. 
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Figure 6 Non trading vs trading. Kyoto + USA scenario. 
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Figure 7 Non trading vs trading. Global Kyoto scenario. 
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Figure 8 Non trading vs trading. Temp scenario. 
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Figure 9 Non trading vs trading. Conc scenario. 
Conc
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
0.500
0.550
0.600
0.650
0.700
0.750
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105
GDP Gini no
trading
GDP Gini
trading
CO2 Gini no
trading
CO2 Gini
trading
 
 
Figure 10 Non trading vs trading. Conc Sov scenario. 
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how future scenarios involving different climate policies 
could affect emissions distribution over time. We find a set of interesting findings derived from 
simulations run with a popular optimal growth model of climate change that we briefly 
summarize.  
First, we find a robust correlation between measures of inequality in income and 
emissions distribution. An important implication for policy-making is that future international 
policies aimed at reducing inequality in the distribution of emissions would be more feasible if 
there were a reduction in income inequality between rich and poor countries. This result agrees 
with previous analogous studies. Of course, environmental policies could have an impact on the 
robustness of this finding. Specifically in this paper we have shown that international climate 
agreements that penalise heavily developing countries could provide a contextual reduction of 
equity together with a redistribution of emissions towards developed countries. In these cases 
evidence of a strong relationship between inequality in income and emissions distribution 
appears ambiguous, but the between group component and consequently the differences in 
GDP between rich and poor regions continue to be the most important determinants of 
emissions distribution. Short-term measures focused on reducing emissions in rich countries 
might be effective for controlling the evolution of global emissions, although in the medium and 
long term the expected economic growth of developing economies (which will reduce income 
and emission inequalities) means that effective climate measures require the participation of 
developing economies. 
Second, unlike previous studies, we provide a more complete explanation of the 
“progressivity” of emissions distribution in comparison to income concentration through the 
Kakwani index. Emissions distribution will be governed by changes in green technology in 
different countries. A lower technological gap for abatement activities between developed and 
developing countries could lead to an increase in the concentration of emissions in rich regions 
and to a decrease of “progressivity”. On the other hand, a reduction in “progressivity” could 
also be induced by a reduction in the gap between countries in terms of industrial technology 
enhancing productivity inputs and determining a lower concentration of income over time. For 
both changes to industrial and green technology, diffusion caused by spillover effects will be 
crucial for influencing technological differences between developing and developed countries 
and consequently the “progressivity” of emissions distribution over time. Moreover, this 
“progressivity” in the concentration of emissions with respect to income inequality is expected 
to experience a considerable reduction during the period considered due to the reduction in 
emissions from land use change in poorer countries.  
Finally, we showed that emissions distribution could depend not only on climate policies 
but also on the flexible mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing efficiency in the accomplishment of 
emissions constraints. Whereas for some scenarios the impact of an emissions permit is 
irrelevant, for others we find that the purchase/sale of permits could determine a significant 
redistribution of emissions among countries. Policy makers focused on achieving more equitable 
emissions distribution over time through international agreements (which are needed in order 
to increase the perceived fairness and widespread acceptability of these agreements) should 
take into account this important aspect when designing policies. 
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